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Maradona and Argentina Are on the Brink

Martes, 22 de septiembre de 2009 Fabian Banchiero 1 comentario
maradonaentretodosBy ROB HUGHES
Published: September 10, 2009

The end is nigh for Diego Maradona, and one hopes that is only as a supposed trainer of men that he is falling apart.

Fantastic as a player, clueless as a coach, Maradona watched, strangely detached, on the touchline in Asunción late Wednesday as his Argentina team succumbed for the second time in a week, its fourth loss in five World Cup qualifiers under his coaching.

He not only looked alone, he looked trapped in his own body. Maradona has some of the most gifted players on earth at his command, but after Paraguay stunned them with a spectacular goal, those players resembled orphans on the outside of the World Cup party.

Lionel Messi looked as if he might cry. Sergio Agüero, Maradona’s son-in-law, seemed isolated, and was replaced within the hour. Juan Veron was sent off after 52 minutes.

Throughout it all, knowing of course that the television cameras would be on him, Maradona barely moved. His arms were folded, or behind his back. He stared straight ahead. Only the two diamonds in his left ear sparkled.

His head was held high, but he consulted no one. He knows, or should know, that he has too little experience of coaching to be alone, yet reports from inside his camp suggest that he humiliates Carlos Bilardo, once Maradona’s coach when Argentina ruled the soccer world.

Julio Grondona, the 77-year-old president of Argentina’s soccer federation, who gave Maradona the job of inspiring the team 10 months ago, also installed Bilardo as mentor. But Grondona has no powers to persuade Maradona to tap Bilardo’s experience. At what point the president will act?

Grondona has created this mess, just as he has overseen a soccer league in Argentina that has fallen into destitution. All Argentina has are players who look great, on somebody else’s teams.

On Wednesday, after England and Spain cruised to join the qualifiers for the 2010 World Cup, Paraguay’s victory meant it had qualified under its own Argentine-born coach, Gerardo Martino.

Maradona refused to see that he had become the problem, the albatross.

“I will not be broken,” he told reporters after the 1-0 defeat. “I did not imagine being in this position, but this is our reality. I am going to face it. We still have a chance, we must start the jigsaw puzzle again, but Argentina has the players to get us out of this.”

Indeed, it does. But will Maradona pick them? Does he know how to instruct them, how to balance the lineup, how to share the knowledge that is all around him?

The pressure is intense. Maradona is a man who, under the pressures of withdrawal from his own peak as one of the finest players in history, developed a chronic drug addiction.

It isn’t too melodramatic to fear for him, and to cry for Argentina at the same time. Here is a country that exports players fit for any stage, and one that even now, with games against Peru and Uruguay to play next month, is capable of joining the other 31 teams at the World Cup — and as a potential winner in South Africa,

But first, Argentina must recognize what isn’t working. The bizarre selections, changing from match to match, included on Wednesday Martín Palermo, an aging striker who last played for his country nine years ago, and Rolando Schiavi, a 36-year-old defender of Newell’s Old Boys in Rosario.

Schiavi had never been chosen for Argentina before. He came on as a substitute long after the confusion in defense gave up the goal after 27 minutes.

Salvador Cabañas, the Paraguayan playmaker, ran rings around three Argentines. He spun with the ball under his spell, three times to outwit defenders. Then he slipped the ball to Nelson Haedo Valdez who, from the left of the penalty box, gave Sergio Romero not a glimmer of chance of stopping his angled shot low inside the far post.

Romero was a debutant, at 22. He was assertive and blameless in defeat.

Watching from London for Sky television, Osvaldo Ardiles, a former team-mate and protector of Maradona, said at half time: “It’s hopeless. We are not a team, we are a collection of individuals — and even the individuals are not showing up.”

If Maradona saw the same performance, he was not letting on.

“I don’t fear critics,” he said. “I don’t fear anybody. I’ve battled the critics since I was 15, now I am 48 and I will keep fighting journalists.”

It isn’t about him. It’s about the team, though that sadly seems to be far from what Argentina now is.

Can a coach be responsible for that?

The evidence from England is that a coach makes a world of difference. England failed to reach the Euro 2008 after losing at home to Croatia. On Wednesday, England crushed Croatia 5-1, its eighth successive victory in its group.

Fabio Capello, the Italian hired to give England order and belief, has the same players who lost two years ago performing with good old English physicality and aerial power.

Spain does it with more subtlety. Vicente Del Bosque, the coach discarded as old-fashioned by Real Madrid, has the team playing to its strengths: at speed and with movement and accuracy. Spain’s record is also played eight, won eight.

England believes it is forging a potential World Cup winner. Spain surely is. Brazil, more pragmatic but potent under Carlos Dunga, has such reserves that it must be a favorite. Four days after beating Argentina, 3-1, in Rosario, Brazil fielded almost a second string and won its 11th straight game, beating Chile, 4-2.

Three of the goals Wednesday came from Nilmar, who will, if he is lucky, be the fourth choice in the World Cup finals. Nilmar, 25, has just returned to Europe, with Villarreal three years after leaving Lyon.

“He’s a player who carries out what you ask him to do, and a little more besides,” Dunga told the media.

In Brazil, the player and the coach know their tasks.

Information Source: NY Times.com

Contraataque

Viernes, 14 de agosto de 2009 admin Sin comentarios

Conocida anoche la decisión de la AFA, Televisión Satelital Codificada -titular de la comercialización de los derechos de TV del fútbol argentino- respondió a través de un comunicado de prensa. En su segundo párrafo informa: “Que tomará todas las medidas judiciales pertinentes para resguardar sus derechos y el de los operadores de televisión paga y abierta con los que tiene celebrados contratos. Que dicho reclamo naturalmente incluirá los daños derivados del incumplimiento contractual, así como el resarcimiento por las inversiones realizadas para garantizar las transmisiones. Dichos reclamos se efectuarán contra los responsables directos e indirectos de esta decisión arbitraria”.

Más adelante, después de recordar que la AFA recibe actualmente “un mínimo garantizado de 268 millones de pesos anuales”, la empresa afirma que “la televisación del fútbol de primera división recauda en la Argentina 304 millones de pesos (197 por los cinco partidos que se ven en el abono básico de cable y 107 por los cinco que van por el sistema Premium o Pay-per-View)”. A continuación, TSC revela que sus utilidades “en el último balance arrojaron un resultado de 10,7 millones de pesos”, una vez descontados los gastos de personal, teconología e impuestos.

Ante las insistentes versiones de que el Estado Nacional le pagaría 600 millones de pesos anuales a la AFA para quedarse con los derechos de TV, para la compañía “resulta evidente que dicho monto es claramente desproporcionado para las posibilidades económicas del mercado argentino de televisión, cuya torta publicitaria total es del orden de los 1.100 millones de pesos”.

Al abundar sobre este punto, TSC destaca que “hoy Canal 7 paga, por un solo partido que transmite los viernes, seis millones de pesos. Si eso se multiplicara por los diez partidos de la fecha, hablaríamos de 60 millones. No de 600″.

Así concluye el texto: “TSC reafirma que siempre ha cumplido con todas sus obligaciones contractuales e informado a la AFA de toda su gestión comercial, la que ha sido periódicamente auditada y aprobada por esta Asociación, a la que incluso se adelantaron pagos hasta la semana pasada”.

Fuente: Ole.com

Categories: Crisis Tags: , ,

The moral hazard of football’s net gains

Jueves, 13 de agosto de 2009 Fabian Banchiero Sin comentarios

When clubs in Spain and Argentina are bailed out like banks, is it time for tighter regulation?

 By Stefan Szymanski
 
The new football season is only days old and already there are widespread fears of financial catastrophe. Relax, the league in question is only the American Arena Football League, but the Argentine Football Association has also delayed the start of its season, claiming that some clubs are effectively bankrupt.

Observers blame the crisis on the reduced flow of transfer spending by European clubs caused by the recession. While the summer headlines have been dominated by Real Madrid’s extravagant spending on Ronaldo and Kaká, and, to a lesser extent, Manchester City’s bid to buy its way into the Premier League elite, most clubs have found themselves strapped for cash.

The Spanish economist Miguel Ángel Barajas has compiled figures demonstrating that the majority of the clubs in La Liga are bankrupt, and yet Real Madrid has loaded itself up with huge debts to buy Europe’s top talent. Italian clubs have been living beyond their means for years now, while in England there are concerns over the indebtedness of Premier League clubs such as Manchester United and Liverpool, and several smaller clubs in the lower leagues live perpetually on the edge of insolvency.

The paradox of all this is that the football industry is incredibly stable. In 1923 the English Football League consisted of 88 clubs in four divisions; today 85 of those clubs survive, 75 are still in the top four divisions and more than half are still in the same division. This is a remarkable record of survival unparalleled by any other major industry in the UK. Yet most of these clubs have lost money consistently over the period and ownership changes are frequent. How can these observations be reconciled? The football industry is, in fact, not unlike the banking industry, a business we have traditionally associated with stability.

Football clubs, like banks, provide a valuable service to local communities. Just as bank credit holds together the economic relationships of a community, so football clubs create a “social credit”, a shared sense of belonging. Like banks, they can never be allowed to go to the wall because of the damage that would do to the fabric of a community. Indeed, when there is a run on a bank, all other banks need to be protected from the potential loss of liquidity to the system; similarly, football clubs in a league need protection from the danger that a rival will fold and not be able to complete its fixtures, depriving the others of both an opponent and income.

And as with the banks, the knowledge that football clubs cannot be allowed to fail creates a “moral hazard” for managers and directors. Why act responsibly and accept midtable mediocrity when you can gamble on reaching the top, knowing that someone will always have to bail you out? In the good times, over-ambitious clubs can at least be disciplined by being forced to sell all their players (ask Leeds United fans); but in a recession a general liquidity crisis is a real risk, leaving only the players and the taxman to bail out the clubs. The last time we had a major recession, in the early 1980s, a large number of clubs flirted with bankruptcy and many were helped out by support from the Professional Footballers’ Association and some indulgence from the Inland Revenue. None “did an Accrington Stanley” and resigned from the league.

As with banking, there are calls for tighter regulation of the football industry. Just as Nicolas Sarkozy berates the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism, so Michel Platini, president of Uefa, berates the English model of football capitalism. Would-be regulators point to the financial controls in Germany and France that require clubs to submit their annual budgets to regulators for approval. But some French and German academics have questioned how effective these regulations are and have pointed to abuses of the system.

We already have informal regulation in the UK — it’s called the planning system. Clubs rarely risk losing the one significant asset essential to their survival — the football ground itself. Planning authorities rarely give permission for the land to be redeveloped for an alternative use and when asset strippers do try to move in, local councils usually put significant obstacles in their way. Although, of course, clubs may choose to move for commercial reasons. There might be a case for enshrining protection of football club grounds into legislation, if only to save fans the trouble and expense of fighting legal battles that they are almost bound to win.

But for the most part the brand of football capitalism practised in England has proved robust and successful over the past 20 years. Not only has the Premier League become the world’s most attractive league, but the Championship has become the fourth most popular league measured by attendance (more fans than Serie A in Italy) and even the third and fourth tiers have had big increases in attendance. This is because the intense competition to succeed has fostered continual innovation while clubs have been able to attract new investors when the old ones have failed, precisely because of the loose regulation.

Rather like the England cricket team, there has been a sorry procession of one failing businessman after another — but why should the rest of us worry when they lose their money?

Stefan Szymanski is Professor of Economics at Cass Business School.

Information Source: TimesOnLine